Monitoring the monitors: How certifying international electoral observation quality can improveelection fraud deterrence1

Matías Caro

doi:10.22529/

Autores/as

Matías Caro Universidad Católica de Córdoba https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8798-0459

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22529/

Palabras clave:

fraude electoral, misiones internacionales de observación electoral, disuasión del fraude, promoción de la democracia, certificación de calidad

Resumen

El fraude electoral es un delito muy extendido, cuyas ramificaciones afectan a los derechos humanos, a la democracia y a la rendición de cuentas. Numerosas misiones de observación se han organizado desde los años 60 para prevenir el fraude electoral. A pesar de la mejora sistemática de las misiones y sus numerosas ventajas, el carácter descentralizado de la observación electoral ha dado lugar a la coexistencia de misiones de observación profesionales y no profesionales o pseudo-misiones de observación. Estas misiones no profesionales evitan las mejores prácticas en la materia y diluyen el potencial preventivo de las misiones propiamente dichas. Este trabajo examina cómo puede mejorarse la observación electoral internacional para eliminar los incentivos a las misiones no profesionales. Tras analizar evidencia empírica y limitaciones, este trabajo propone la creación de una agencia internacional de certificación de misiones que ayude a hacer cumplir los estándares y las mejores prácticas entre las organizaciones de observación.

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Biografía del autor/a

Matías Caro, Universidad Católica de Córdoba

Catholic University of Cordoba, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, Argentina.

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