Monitoring the monitors: How

certifying international electoral

observation quality can improve

election fraud deterrence

Observando a los observadores:

Cómo la certicación de la calidad

de la observación electoral

internacional puede mejorar la

disuasión del fraude electoral

Matías Caro

This article was written with the support of the FCDO, through the Chevening programme,

as part of my MSc Criminal Justice and Criminology dissertation at the University of Leeds.

I would also like to thank Dr Stuart Goosey and Judge Guillermo Wellman for their support

in the writing of this paper.

Catholic University of Cordoba, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, Argentina. matias.

caro@ucc.edu.ar. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8798-0459.

http://dx.doi.org/10.22529/sp.2024.62.02

STUDIA POLITICÆ Número 62 otoño 2024 pág. 31–57

Recibido: 19/02/2024 | Aceptado: 5/07/2024

Publicada por la Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales

de la Universidad Católica de Córdoba, Córdoba, República Argentina.

32 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

Abstract

Electoral fraud is a widespread crime whose ramications affect human ri-

ghts, democracy and political accountability. Numerous election observation

missions have been organised since the 1960s to prevent electoral fraud.

Despite the missions’ systematic improvement, and its many benets, the

decentralised nature of election observation has led to the coexistence of

professional and non-professional or pseudo-observation missions. These

unprofessional missions evade best practices and dilute the preventive po-

tential of proper missions. This work examine how international election

observation can be improved to removing incentives for non-professional

missions. After analysing empirical evidence and limitations, this work pro-

poses the establishment of an international mission certication agency to

aid in enforcing standards and best practices among observing organisations.

Keywords: election fraud - international electoral observation missions -

fraud deterrence - democracy promotion - quality certication

Resumen

El fraude electoral es un delito muy extendido, cuyas ramicaciones afec-

tan a los derechos humanos, a la democracia y a la rendición de cuentas.

Numerosas misiones de observación se han organizado desde los años 60

para prevenir el fraude electoral. A pesar de la mejora sistemática de las

misiones y sus numerosas ventajas, el carácter descentralizado de la obser-

vación electoral ha dado lugar a la coexistencia de misiones de observación

profesionales y no profesionales o pseudo-misiones de observación. Estas

misiones no profesionales evitan las mejores prácticas en la materia y dilu-

yen el potencial preventivo de las misiones propiamente dichas. Este trabajo

examina cómo puede mejorarse la observación electoral internacional para

eliminar los incentivos a las misiones no profesionales. Tras analizar eviden-

cia empírica y limitaciones, este trabajo propone la creación de una agencia

internacional de certicación de misiones que ayude a hacer cumplir los

estándares y las mejores prácticas entre las organizaciones de observación.

Palabras clave: fraude electoral - misiones internacionales de observación

electoral - disuasión del fraude - promoción de la democracia - certicación

de calidad

Introduction

here are many reasons to consider electoral fraud a crime of great im-

portance. First, electoral fraud violates the human right to choose ru-

lers through fair elections. This right has been enshrined in numerous

MATÍAS CARO 33

instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United

Nations, 1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(United Nations, 1966). Secondly, elections are often the only opportunity

citizens have to replace rulers with whom they are dissatised, so electoral

fraud damages accountability and citizens’ trust in democracy (Birch, 2011).

Moreover, fraud is costly when committed by the state, leading to subopti-

mal use of public resources (Lehoucq, 2003; Vicente, 2014). Finally, elec-

toral fraud is widespread; Simpser (2005) estimates that approximately one

in ve presidential elections between 1975 and 2005 was corrupt. However,

the literature consistently states that electoral fraud has been little studied

and claims a better understanding of the phenomenon (Molina and Lehoucq,

1999; Lehobuq, 2003; Simpser, 2005; Alvarez et al., 2009; Birch, 2011).

Due to the signicance of electoral fraud, international election observation

missions have emerged as a mechanism to prevent it. In order to assess diffe

rent elections by independent observers, missions have grown over time to

become an almost ubiquitous reality today. The number of elections monito

red increased from an average of 10% between 1975 and 1987 to 81.5% of

elections in 2004 (Kelley, 2008). The rationale behind this international poli

cy is that adverse international observation reports regarding the transparen-

cy of the election trigger a series of local and international punishments for

the country and government observed (Kelley, 2008; Hyde, 2011b). Howe

ver, despite the popularity of election observation, fraud is more than present

today (Leeffers and Vicente, 2019; Escobari and Hoover, 2020).

The persistence of electoral fraud despite the popularity of election observa

tion missions has prompted academics to call for an improvement in inter-

national election observation (Hyde, 2011a; Kelley, 2012). Hence, this paper

seeks to answer how international election observation can be improved.

This work argues that establishing an institution in charge of certifying the

quality of observation missions can advance their role. Electoral observation

is a highly decentralised process in which professional missions coexist with

pseudo-missions that endorse commissioned elections. The certication of

the different organisations that carry out international election observation

can help differentiate between professional and unprofessional missions, in-

creasing the dissuasive power of the proper missions and creating incentives

for applying best contemporary practices.

The theoretical construction of this analysis is mainly descriptive and propo

sitional. Although since the emergence of international election observation

there have been many proposals for its improvement, there are currently no

34 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

proposals aimed at discouraging the proliferation of non-professional mis-

sions or at reducing the incentives of the governments that invite them. Hen-

ce, the state of the art on this particular sub-topic is not sufcient to move

towards a public policy analysis (Dunn, 2015, p. 2). Based on this descriptive

and propositional character, the rst section analyses whether election ob-

servation missions can deter electoral fraud, under what circumstances they

work best, and what evidence exists.

The second section addresses the current limitations of observation missions

in preventing electoral fraud. The third section presents the proposal for an

independent international agency in charge of certifying observation mis

sions. It explains how it would contribute to overcoming many limitations

of observation missions and discusses the possible limitations of such an

agency. Finally, conclusions are provided, emphasising the call that various

authors have made to consider and propose improvements to election obser

vation missions to advance electoral fraud prevention (Hyde, 2011a; Kelley,

2012) and how the proposal for an independent mission certication agency

responds to this call.

1. International election observation to prevent electoral fraud

This paper aims to analyse whether international election observers prevent

the commission of electoral fraud and how this effect can be enhanced. The

answers to these questions are complex because there is currently a discus

sion in the literature on how to dene electoral fraud at the international

level. Second, international election observation missions are not homoge-

nous but have varied over time and across organisations. Finally, in order to

propose the improvement of this institution, it is necessary to know about its

functioning, empirical evidence and contexts in which it works best.

1.1 Dening electoral fraud and election observation

Electoral fraud can be understood as the crimes against democratic elections

contemplated in the legislation of each country (UNODC, 2015); this deni

tion has been criticised for being restrictive, as there are differences between

what each country considers electoral crimes. In this sense, attempts have

been made to nd substantive denitions of the problem; one of the propo-

sals is to use the broader concept of electoral malpractice, i.e. “the manipu-

lation of electoral processes and outcomes to substitute personal or partisan

benet for the public interest” (Birch, 2011, p.12). However, the operationa-

MATÍAS CARO 35

lisation of what constitutes the public interest itself still needs to be solved

for the adoption of the concept of electoral malpractice. Moreover, despite

differences in this regard, legislation consistently denes specic types of

practices as electoral offences, with violence against voters, vote buying,

ballot stufng, and the modication of results (Schedler, 2002). What is clear

is that electoral fraud is an eminently rational crime, i.e., whose commission

involves a detailed calculation of costs and benets (Bailey, 2009). This ra-

tionality explains how electoral fraud, which was very common in Europe

and America during the 19th century, was reduced through a situational cri-

me prevention mechanism (Clarke, 1995) such as the secret ballot (Lehoucq

and Molina, 2002; Lehoucq, 2003).

Since electoral fraud is a rational and practical crime (Wantchekon, 2003;

Brusco et al., 2004; Schaffer, 2007), the central policy that has been adopted at

the international level to reduce it is international election observation (IEO).

The IEO missions consist of sending a delegation of foreign experts to the

country where the election will take place with the objectives of a) analysing

the legitimacy of the elections, b) detecting and preventing electoral fraud, and

c) improving the electoral system. The organisation and work of these foreign

delegations have been professionalised and improved over time. However, the

re are still observation missions that carry out their work in an unprofessional

manner or direct collusion with the observed government, throwing away any

crime prevention capacity of the missions (Bjornlund, 2004; Kelley, 2012).

This distinction is crucial as the IEO is often criticised for problems of unpro

fessional missions. The question arises regarding how its proper application

deters electoral fraud, which is discussed in the next subtitle.

1.2 How does international election observation prevent electoral fraud?

The rational explanation of crime postulates that criminals analyse the ex-

pected benets of criminal activity compared to its costs, which consist of

the level of punishment and its probability (Becker, 1968). In this sense,

incumbents face a dilemma in every election: On the one hand, they can

run democratic elections, gaining a number of international benets

but

risking their seats. On the other hand, they can secure power without ha-

ving elections but losing the international benets of being a democratic

country. Electoral fraud is then geared toward gaining international and

Foreign aid, foreign investment, membership in international organisations, trade, tou-

rism, legitimacy and prestige.

36 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

local benets without facing its costs

. To avoid this shortcut, IEO aims to

change the incentives for fraud by increasing the chances of detection and

punishment

(Hyde, 2011b; Kelley, 2012).

Concerning punishments, there is sufcient evidence that after adverse re-

ports on elections, countries have faced punishments at the international le-

vel. Among these penalties are the suspension or elimination of foreign aid,

foreign investment, a decrease in trade and tourism, loss of membership

in international organisations and loss of legitimacy and prestige (Hyde,

2011). Furthermore, in some cases, they have been denied the possibility

of borrowing from international organisations (Vigna, 2010). The IEO also

allows pseudo-democrats to be punished locally by increasing the possibi-

lities for protest and revolution (Tucker, 2007; Little, 2012). All protest is a

collective action problem; election observers help lower protest repression

by attracting international attention (Magaloni, 2010). Empirically, it has

been proven that observers increase the likelihood of boycotts (Beaulieu

and Hyde, 2009) and that fraud protests are more likely, last longer and

attract more supporters following adverse reports from international obser-

vers (Hyde and Marinov, 2014).

Concerning the likelihood of punishment, international observers indepen-

dently assess each step of the election, from the pre-election period throu-

gh election day to nally the acceptance of the results by all contending

parties, making it much more difcult for electoral fraud to be hidden.

This control mechanism is complicated to avoid since the non-acceptance

of international observers suggests that the incumbent wants to commit

fraud (Bjornlund, 2004; Kelley, 2008a). In addition, election observation

has developed better strategies and techniques to cope with its tasks and

limitations over time. Finally, international observers contribute to crime

prevention in two indirect ways: by formulating recommendations for the

improvement of the electoral processes and through the so-called policy

transfer

(Evans, 2019).

Sometimes, even with power secured, incumbents commit fraud in elections that they

could have won transparently to widen the margins of victory to demotivate and demobilise

the opposition (Rundlett & Svolik, 2016).

The role of international observation missions becomes more critical in light of the fact

that many countries’ judiciaries cannot combat electoral fraud (Murison, 2013).

Observers who participated in the Philippines election in 1987 later introduced new poli-

cies in their countries (Kelley, 2012).

MATÍAS CARO 37

1.3 Does international election observation work?

Crime and fraud, in general, are difcult to measure. In the case of electoral

fraud and IEO, there is the additional problem of the “reporting effect”, i.e.

more irregularities can be found in observed elections than in unobserved

ones, simply because they have been scrutinised. However, a growing body

of literature empirically proves IEO usefulness for preventing electoral cri

mes. One of the primary empirical studies on the subject is Hyde’s (2007)

analysis of Armenia’s 2003 elections. After Armenia’s independence in 1991,

until 2003, every single election in the country was considered highly frau

dulent, and the 2003 election was no exception (Hyde, 2007).

During the 2003 Armenian presidential election, the OSCE/ODIHR deplo

yed 233 observers for the rst round and 193 for the second round. Although

the deployment of observers was not strictly random, Hyde (2007) argues

that the conditions under which the polling stations were assigned and visited

can be considered ‘as if’ random, making the groups of visited and non-visi

ted polling stations comparable. Polling stations (PS) were then divided into

four groups: PS visited during the rst round, PS visited during the second

round, PS visited both times and the control group of PS that was never

visited. Hyde (2007) found that the incumbent’s vote share decreased from

6% in the rst round to 2% in the second round in observed polling stations

compared to unobserved polling stations, which could be explained by fraud

deterrence of election observation.

In 2004, during Indonesia’s rst direct presidential election, Hyde (2010)

conducted a randomised experiment on election observation. In contrast to

the Armenian elections 2003, the prediction was for a largely transparent

election in this case. For the experiment, 57 observers were randomly dis

tributed among 28 villages in selected districts. The effect of the observers

was compared with the second round of electoral data. Polls predicted a vic-

tory for challenger Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono over incumbent Megawa-

ti Sukarnoputri by 60% to 29%; the nal results were virtually identical.

Despite the extensive transparency of the elections, Hyde (2010) found that

Yudhoyono’s vote share remained constant in the villages observed, but Me-

gawati’s increased in 75% of the cases. According to the author, this was

due to observers preventing polling station ofcials from closing before the

ofcial nishing time, allowing a more demobilised electorate such as Me-

gawati to vote.

The studies on the elections in Armenia in 2003 and Indonesia in 2004 are

the only ones that permit the sustaining of a causal relationship between in

38 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

ternational election observation and the deterrence of electoral fraud; other

studies are less conclusive in this respect. Hyde and O’Mahony (2010) infer

this deterrence effect and argue that countries use tax manipulation -spending

more or taxing less- as a proselytising strategy before elections. However,

tax manipulation is an economically costly and uncertain strategy in electoral

terms, so it works as a second best when electoral fraud is not possible. This

is why Hyde and O’Mahony (2010) argue that the presence of international

observers should generate more signicant incentives for tax manipulation

by preventing electoral fraud. Analysing 95 developing countries over 14

years, the authors found that countries with elections that were going to be

rigged, provided their nances were not scrutinised by an international body,

were more likely to engage in pre-election scal manipulation than countries

that had unobserved elections.

Roussias and Ruiz-Runo (2018) analysed the margins of victory (competi

tiveness) between incumbents and challengers in dictatorships and democra-

cies. They found that margins of victory remained unchanged in democratic

countries regardless of whether elections were observed. In contrast, margins

of victory tended to decrease in observed elections in dictatorships, which

would be due to a reduced possibility of electoral fraud because incumbents’

hands were ‘tied’ by observers (Roussias and Ruiz-Runo, 2018). However,

the direction of the relationship is not clear since dictatorships that plan to

conduct clean elections are the most likely to invite international observers

(Hyde, 2011b), and even more, some leaders may commit fraud to reduce

their margin of victory to prevent elections for producing dubious results

(Hyde and Marinov, 2012).

A second way of evaluating the impact of observation on election fraud in

volves the analysis of the domestic observers, generally grouped into NGOs,

who carry out tasks similar to those of international observation. However,

their comparability is still being determined as they tend to work in more sig-

nicant numbers, have better local knowledge and have fewer possibilities of

triggering international penalties. Beyond this discussion, there is evidence of

the deterrent role of domestic observation. Regarding registration fraud, the

presence of observers reduced the number of people registered at registration

centres by 4.1% for Ghana’s 2008 elections (Ichino and Schündeln, 2012).

Domestic observation can also have an effect against ballot stufng and ag

gregation fraud; in Russia’s 2011 parliamentary elections, the results indica-

ted a 10.8% decrease in the percentage of votes for the ruling party and an

increase in votes for all opposition parties in the observed polling stations

MATÍAS CARO 39

(Enikolopov et al., 2013). Even more signicant are the ndings of Callen and

Long (2015), to whom domestic observation produced a reduction of around

25% of the vote share of politically powerful candidates in Afghanistan. In the

same vein, studies in Ghana (Asunka et al., 2019) and Mozambique (Leeffers

and Vicente, 2019) have proven that in monitored polling, the turnout decrea-

ses; this is explained because turnout is generally inated by ballot stufng

or aggregation fraud. However, the evidence is not as linear. Casas, Díaz and

Trindade (2017) found that party monitors increased their parties’ vote share

in Argentina between 1.5% and 6%. The authors argue that this is because

they prevent fraud against their party. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the

increase is because they commit fraud in favour of their parties.

Sjoberg (2012) found evidence that domestic observers reduced fraud in

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, but with a much smaller reduction in

Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is much less sensitive to prevention through obser

vation because Western powers are less likely to sanction hydrocarbon-pro-

ducing countries despite their weak democratic commitment. Finally, Buzin,

Brondum and Robertson (2016), analysing the same elections as Enikolopov

et al. (2013), found no evidence that domestic observers deterred fraud. In

order to explain their lack of results, the authors hypothesise that the number

of observers affects their preventive capacity; they deployed one observer

per polling station against 3 or 4 deployed by Enikolopov et al. (2013) ex

periment. In conclusion, there is evidence to claim an empirical impact of

observation on electoral fraud. However, more and better studies are needed

to prove IEO’s usefulness.

1.4 When does it work?

Electoral observation is far from a perfect mechanism; it does not work with

any design and in any context, and even when it works, it does not eliminate

electoral fraud but somewhat diminishes it. Because of these limitations, be

tter implementation and improvement of international election observation

involves knowing in which contexts it works best. Concerning the context,

electoral observation has less deterrent power in winner-take-all contexts

(Kelley, 2012); in the same vein, Birch (2007) states that fraud is more li-

kely in single-member districts (SMD) under plurality and majority, which

are types winner-take-all scenarios. In proportional elections, defeat allows

parties to gain some benet regarding seats; even if the race is close, there

is not much difference between the benets obtained by the rst and second

parties. On the contrary, in winner-take-all systems, the expected benets of

victory and the high costs of defeat increase the incentives to commit fraud.

40 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

It is also clear that international election observation works best when

countries are interested in cooperating with the Western hemisphere (Ke

lley, 2012). Other signicant players in international politics, such as China,

have been much less inclined to make their cooperation conditional on the

existence of a specic type of political regime (Bader et al., 2010; Bader,

2013). Moreover, this willingness to cooperate with the West works best

when countries do not have the power to secure cooperation by other means.

During the Cold War, the West was much more willing to cooperate with

dictatorships as long as they were pro-capitalist (Knack, 2004). Today, being

an oil or gas-producing country guarantees cooperation with the West despite

numerous evidence of fraud, such as the case of Russia or the reduced sensi

tivity to observation found by Sjoberg (2012) in Azerbaijan. Again, in these

cases, the West’s punitive machinery is not activated because of strategic

dependence.

Election observation plays a better preventive role when parties have dif

culties monitoring each other (Asunka et al., 2019). In other words, party

observers are not a substitute for election observation; while party observers

prevent fraud against their parties, they do not necessarily ensure the trans-

parency of elections in the way that election observation seeks to ensure;

election observation acts as a third party and not as a stakeholder. In addi

tion, election observation works best when there are domestic pressures for

electoral improvements when public administration is more efcient, and

when there are no powerful country interests in a particular outcome (Kelley,

2012).

This section has claried how election observation deters electoral fraud by

making it costlier. Pseudo-democrats have incentives to conduct clean elec

tions, given that a negative report from an international observation mis-

sion carries a series of domestic and international punishments. An incipient

empirical literature supports observers’ effectiveness in preventing crime.

However, various limitations have reduced their deterrent capacity over

time. Many proposals have been made to improve the role of the IEO, but

the existence of non-professional observing missions has undermined many

of these efforts.

2. The limits of election observation

There is a widespread misconception that election observation is a monoli

thic practice; on the contrary, it is an evolving and perfecting practice. The

MATÍAS CARO 41

observation arose from the need of some autocratic governments in Latin

America in the 1950s and 1960s to demonstrate their true intention to hold

fair elections. The rst missions consisted of a few notable observers who at-

tended election day and assessed the country’s respect for human rights; the

limitations of this type of observation in the prevention of election fraud are

ostensible. Already in the 1990s, observers were chastised for their lack of

professionalism, focus on election day, lack of international guidelines, small

number, and poor coverage (Geisler, 1993; Carothers, 1997). However, by

the same time the rst observation protocols had been established (Garber,

1984), numerous improvements had been implemented (Nevitte and Canton,

1997), and new observation techniques had already played a key role (Garber

and Cowan, 1993).

By the early 2000s, it was clear what was and what was not professional elec

tion observation (Bjornlund, 2004); the limitations that were overcome by

election observation are still present in many pseudo-observation missions,

and even professional missions are not exempt from avoiding best practices.

Pseudo-observation should be suppressed, whether it is based on political

expediency or lack of expertise, as it delegitimises election observation it

self and thus damages its preventive capacity. Moreover, its suppression is

essential for the empirical evaluation of election observation because even if

similar, only real observation contributes to deterring electoral fraud.

2.1 Residual limitations

Among the limitations that should have been overcome by now, but are still

present in some unprofessional or pseudo-observation missions, are the lack

of international guidelines, professionalism, training, territorial coverage,

neutrality and impartiality, collaboration with domestic observers and proper

deployment, short-term oriented and focused on election day. Election obser

vation was criticised for lacking international guidelines (Geisler, 1993), and

since that time, there have been efforts by practitioners (OAS, 2007; OSCE,

2010; African Union, 2013) and academics (Garber, 1984; Elklit and Svens-

son, 1997; Elklit and Reynolds, 2005) to dene guidelines. In addition, each

mission makes explicit its criteria and methodology for election monitoring

(Hyde, 2011b). What has not been overcome yet is the lack of enforcement

of these guidelines; because of this, organisations can avoid best practices

without consequences.

Concerning the lack of professionalism and training of observers (Geisler,

1993; Carothers, 1997), the signatory organisations of the Declaration of

42 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

Principles for International Election Observation (United Nations, 2005)

commit themselves to training their observers in the details of each elec

tion. In terms of professionalism, today’s missions include experts in di-

fferent areas; the OSCE handbook (2005) provides for a political analyst,

media analyst, gender analyst, national minorities analyst, electronic-voting

analyst, voter registration analyst, statistical analyst and security expert. In

addition, fraud detection strategies have been developed and currently in

clude audits of voter lists (Hyde, 2009), parallel vote tabulation (Garber and

Cowan, 1993), turnout and vote share analysis (Mebane and Kalinin, 2009;

Klimek et al., 2012; Beber and Scacco, 2012; Leemann and Bochsler, 2014)

and analysis of population changes (Fukumoto and Horiuchi, 2011). Again,

the application of these methods and the selection and training of their mem-

bers is at the discretion of each organisation.

Regarding the lack of observers and limited territorial coverage, Geisler

(1993) argues that the coverage of some missions needed to be enlarged to

claim the power to assess elections in general. This lack of coverage is be

cause the high costs of international election observation limit the deploy-

ment of observers, who also tend to be deployed in the capital cities, where

the organisation can play a more prominent role, making it difcult to assess

the rest of the country. Against this background, the Declaration of Princi-

ples for Election Observation (United Nations, 2005) states that observation

missions should be large enough to independently and impartially assess a

country’s electoral process. In practice, this has translated into a systematic

increase in the average number of observers for each election, from around

20 per election in the 1960s to over 200 per election today (Hyde, 2011a).

It has also been argued that observation has been too focused on election

day and short-term oriented (Geisler, 1993; Carothers, 1997). This is espe

cially problematic because if the entire object of intervention is election day

and a few days after, the incumbent interested in committing fraud has the

option to shift the fraud to the pre-election period, altering voting records,

limiting opposition candidate registration, and restricting access to press and

campaign resources. There is a commitment by the signatory organisations

of the Declaration of Principles of Electoral Observation to carry out long-

term observation, i.e. the monitoring and evaluation of the entire pre-elec-

tion, election and post-election period, generally, until all contenders accept

the results. Furthermore, in professional missions, organisations make their

participation conditional on the guarantee of broad and unrestricted access

to all stages and actors in the electoral process (OAS, 2007; OSCE, 2010).

MATÍAS CARO 43

Election observation has also been accused of lacking impartiality and neu-

trality (Geisler, 1993); against this, the Declaration of Principles of Election

Observation postulates the need for impartiality, the prohibition of recruiting

observers with conicts of interest, the disclosure of the donors that made

observation possible, and the non-acceptance of funding by the host country

(United Nations, 2005). Organisations currently carry out their work inuen

ced by their funding and political commitments. International governmental

organisations have been less likely to criticise their member countries (Kelley,

2012) and that some, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

or UNASUR, seek to certify member countries elections (Planchuelo, 2017).

A modication of the incentives system is therefore needed so that organisa

tions tend towards impartiality beyond the interests of their contributors.

Finally, IEO has been accused of not collaborating and even relegating the

role of domestic observers, with the aggravating circumstance that the latter

are more effective, more numerous, have more comprehensive coverage and

better knowledge of the local reality (Geisler, 1993). Currently, the hand

books of the different organisations contemplate consultation and collabora-

tion with those who are considered credible domestic observers (OAS, 2007;

OSCE, 2010). Collaboration with local observers has excellent potential, but

caution in doing so remains essential as “in many countries domestic election

monitoring organisations are relatively easy for pseudo-democrats to discre

dit as biased, refuse to credential, or falsify by allowing only loyal govern-

ment supporters to be credentialed as domestic observers” (Hyde, 2011b, p.

166). In conclusion, the theoretical overcoming of all these limitations and

their residual presence in practice, is explained by the lack of an instance

that fosters the enforcement of good practices, hence the importance of this

paper’s proposal of creating an institution that evaluates and certies the

quality of missions.

2.2 Limitations to Overcome

International election observation still has to overcome certain limitations.

In this sense, international electoral observation has been criticised for the

difculties generated by its decentralised system, for the lack of certainty

in punishments, lack of impartiality, for the short time that each observer

spends in each polling station, for their voluntary nature and for the externa

lities that they generate.

Regarding decentralisation, this implies that no organisation has the mo

nopoly of international observation; countries jealous of their sovereignty

44 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

have not wanted to delegate it to the United Nations or other institution,

which is why numerous international governmental and non-governmental

organisations have taken up the baton (Kelley, 2008b). This decentralisa-

tion has advantages in that no single actor has veto power over observation.

Also, when different missions come to the same conclusions about an elec

tion, their effect is enhanced (Kelley, 2008b). Furthermore, decentralisation

allows a government to reject an observation mission from an organisation

that it considers biased but may accept a mission from a different organisa-

tion (Kelley, 2012). The monopoly of observation would limit observation at

the global level to countries that trust in the transparency and impartiality of

such a monopolistic organisation.

This decentralisation also has its disadvantages. Firstly, it leads to inter-or

ganisational competition, which limits cooperation and the quality of results.

The main objective of any organisation is to endure over time, and for this,

they need donor funding, which often depends on having a high prole in

the elections they observe. This need to raise the prole limits collaboration,

as organisations do not want to be subsumed under an umbrella that takes

away their prominence. It has also led them to compete over who can present

their ndings sooner after election day, gaining local media attention but

jeopardising the quality of their work (Kelley, 2008b). However, the worst

problem that currently exists in this regard is the lack of distinction between

missions. This indistinction implies that different organisations monitor elec-

tions with equal authority (Kelley, 2008b). Pseudo-democrats have adapted

to this situation and have created a shadow market for election observation

(Daxecker and Schneider, 2014), i.e. they invite friendly or low-quality ob-

servation missions (Hyde, 2011b) alone or in conjunction with other pro-

fessional missions to qualify criticism of professional election observation.

The lack of knowledge and control is so evident that organisations such as

UNASUR directly declare that they do not carry out observation but rather

electoral ‘accompaniment’ without major consequences (Planchuelo, 2017).

Pseudo-democrats use these favourable certications to escape the internal

and external punishments that international observation seeks to activate and

thus dilute the deterrent potential of electoral observation.

Concerning the lack of certainty of punishment, it is more than clear that pe

nalties do not deter if there is the hope of impunity. In this sense, as already

mentioned, the international community has had difculties in guarantee-

ing punishment for pro-Western dictatorships during the Cold War (Hyde,

2011b) or oil and gas exporting countries today. However, there are also

MATÍAS CARO 45

apparent difculties in punishing core countries - no one wants to punish the

United States, even though, according to Bjornlund (2004), the 2000 election

process in the United States was severely awed. Finally, observers tend to

tone down their criticism when elections are held in a country in transition

to democracy, when, despite their limitations, they have demonstrated a wi-

llingness to improve or when criticism of the results may trigger a wave of

violence (Kelley, 2009). Even if they choose to criticise them for observed

electoral fraud, central countries often do not want to cut off aid to poor

countries just because they fail to perform quality elections (Hyde, 2011b).

However, this is not too problematic given that it is a general power of prose

cutors to look beyond the crime to consider whether a prosecution is required

in the public interest.

Election observation is also criticised for the short time observers spend at

each polling station. The current response is that observers are instructed to

remain in place in the presence of red ags (Hyde, 2011b), but the argument

goes much deeper. Critics argue that by staying only a short time at the po

lling stations, the fraud simply stops with the arrival of the observers and

resumes upon their departure. However, rather than xed observers in some

polling stations, it can be argued that the fundamental principle of survei-

llance is the panopticon (Foucault, 2000), i.e. not being observed, but the

perception that one can be observed at any time. In this sense, the mobility of

observers over a determined and secret group of polling stations could have

greater dissuasive power than their immobility

. However, more studies are

needed to assess which mode of deployment is more effective.

This whole prevention scheme is not triggered if the country decides not

to invite observers. A country cannot be forced to receive an observation

mission it does not want, as this would be a violation of the principle of

sovereignty. To solve this limitation, it has been proposed as a condition to

participate in international organisations, the automatic acceptance of obser

vation missions that monitor the democratic commitment of countries (Mu-

ñoz-Pogossian and Veloso, 2015). However, currently, only the Organisation

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with its 57 member states,

has such a requirement, leaving much of the world outside this mechanism.

Finally, election observation has been criticised for the externalities it ge

Criminology has consistently studied the relationship between patrolling and crime, n-

ding positive evidence in this regard (Sherman et al., 2002; Weisburd & Eck, 2004; Ratcli-

ffe et al., 2020).

46 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

nerates. In this sense, election observation would produce changes in the

mechanisms of fraud (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009; Sjoberg, 2012), the displa

cement of fraud to unobserved areas (Asunka et al., 2019), pre-electoral and

post-electoral violence (Daxecker, 2012; Daxecker, 2014) and even more

complex crimes (Simpser, 2009) such as rigging courts and administrative

bodies and repressing the media (Simpser and Donno, 2012). What no one

has noticed so far is that it is not so easy to move between types of crime;

there is always a learning curve and more signicant risks when entering into

unfamiliar practices. Moreover, it is not so easy to move from electoral fraud

to electoral malpractice because electoral malpractice is much more evident

to the local public (Skovoroda and Lankina, 2017). Public perception and

disapproval are more likely if, legally or by threats, the participation of an

opponent is limited than if the results are changed during vote aggregation.

In addition to being costlier, moving from electoral fraud to other practices

is also more uncertain in terms of results, which is why they are often the

second best. For example, in 1973, the dictatorship that ruled Argentina pros

cribed Juan Domingo Perón from the election. In any case, with the slogan

“Campora to the government, Peron to the power”, José Cámpora won the

elections. After taking ofce, he called for new elections without Peron’s

proscription, and 49 days after Campora’s inauguration, Peron took demo

cratically the power.

In summary, despite the constant improvement that international election

observation has undergone since its origins, there are still numerous limita

tions that should have been overcome or are yet to be overcome. The section

that follows discusses how an international certication agency can help to

overcome or address the majority of these limitations in order to improve the

capacity of observation missions to deter electoral fraud.

3. Monitoring the monitors

To describe one of the central problems of international election observation,

Kelley (2012) draws an analogy with the classic work of the Roman poet

Juvenal. In his Satires, the protagonist is burdened by a problem of marital

delity. When faced with the suggestion of his friends to place guards in his

wife’s bedroom, he asks, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who watches the

watchers?). Kelley (2012) is correct; many of the current problems of elec

tion observation stem from the lack of an oversight body. The international

election observation system is currently highly decentralised and deregula-

MATÍAS CARO 47

ted. As discussed in the previous sections, this decentralisation and deregula-

tion has its advantages, but it also creates difculties.

This paper proposes that creating an organisation that certies observation

missions is necessary to order and regulate the electoral observation sys

tem without falling into a monopoly that would undermine their diversity

and expansion. Certication implies “the process by which an agency or an

association acknowledges the achievement of established quality standards

and usually grants certain privileges to the target individual” (Vlăsceanu et

al., 2004, p. 42). i.e. the certifying agency would have the central role of

evaluating whether the different organisations apply the established quality

standards to earn the right to be recognised as professional missions.

3.1 Overcoming residual limitations

In Section 2, it was mentioned that numerous limitations should have been

overcome by now, but that remain residual due to the decentralisation and

deregulation of election observation missions. Concerning the lack of inter

national guidelines, there are no mechanisms to enforce them. The existence

of a certifying agency could be of great advantage in this respect. Both the

observation missions and pseudo-missions depend on funding, in the rst

case from donors and the second from interested countries. Nevertheless, if

the missions are evaluated by a rating agency and receive a poor rating for

not adhering to international guidelines, their survival is in jeopardy. First,

donors will be more reluctant to fund missions that receive low ratings, so

there is a greater incentive for organisations to improve their practices. Se-

cond, pseudo-democrats will nd little benet in funding missions that are

poorly rated and cannot convince the population or the international system

of the supposed transparency of elections.

Concerning the lack of professionalism and training of members, a certifying

agency can control whether or not the organisation trained observers, evalua

te their training in terms of international guidelines, organisation manuals,

and mission methodology, and observe and evaluate the observers’ perfor-

mance in practice. The certifying agency could also check the number of

observers, the adequate territorial coverage

, and long-term work. Regarding

Even in cases where the number of observers does not allow a representative number

of polling stations, there are other methods in which statistically representative polling

stations are selected based on the results of previous elections, and their control can allow

having a reasonably accurate estimation of the electoral outcome (Cotelo, 2017).

48 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

lack of neutrality or impartiality, certication would be an internal control

within the different missions. The correct application of procedures would

make it much more difcult for pseudo-missions to provide a positive as-

sessment of non-transparent elections without straining the internal process

or alerting evaluators.

Finally, with regard to collaboration with domestic observers, many organi

sations have been reluctant to collaborate with domestic observers and have

even treated them with paternalism and contempt (Geisler, 1993). Although

collaboration with local observers is covered in numerous observation ma

nuals (OAS, 2007; OSCE, 2010; African Union, 2013), the attitudes des-

cribed by Geisler (1993) may limit cooperation in practice. Collaboration

with local observers brings numerous benets (Geisler, 1993; Horcasitas,

1997) and has excellent potential in the development and application of new

crowdsourcing tools

(Birch, 2011; Bader, 2013), so if it becomes a require-

ment to be evaluated by the certifying agency, the incentives for missions to

collaborate with them will become more outstanding.

3.2 Addressing Unresolved Limitations

The second section also presents several limitations that election observation

missions have yet to overcome, the existence of a certifying agency can also

help address these constraints. Regarding the lack of certainty in punish

ments, it is true that many Great Powers have acted differently in whether

to apply punishments to non-democratic countries based on their specic

interests. This difculty is complicated to overcome. However, a certifying

agency can make it costlier for Great Powers to ignore adverse reports that

come from organisations whose methodology has been endorsed.

The lack of neutrality or impartiality refers to the dependence of many mo

nitoring organisations on the donor’s interests. In this case, the existence of a

certication agency can generate a balance of incentives that helps to control

the organisation’s bias. On the one hand, missions are incentivised to present

their ndings in a way that does not affect the interests of their donors in

order not to lose funding. However, on the other hand, overly biased expres-

sions could lead to a negative evaluation and the consequent loss of funding.

Secondly, Kelley (2008b) argues that organisations often make false claims

of neutrality, which are easy to contradict when analysing the funding or

Crowdsourcing allows citizens to get involved in election monitoring by creating mecha-

nisms for reporting irregularities (Mazerolle & Ransley, 2006).

MATÍAS CARO 49

composition of missions. Assessing this discordance by a certifying agency

may create incentives for missions to avoid claiming neutrality when they are

objectively not. Finally, many observation organisations compete for public

attention to improve their funding chances. This tendency has been dened

by Kelley (2008b) as inter-organisational politics and leads, in many cases,

to missions rushing to submit their reports on election night in order to be the

rst to grab press attention. This competition leads to partial or incomplete

reports, even assessing an election process that has not yet been completed. A

certication agency could penalise and discourage such practices.

Another common criticism is that international observers spend too little

time at each polling station. However, there is no empirical evidence that

lack of time undermines fraud deterrence. A certifying agency can contribute

in this regard by collecting and systematising information on the develop

ment of each electoral mission. This information can then be used to assess

what works in election observation, which, as mentioned above, is an area

that needs to be developed. It has also been mentioned that the voluntary

nature of the missions means that not all countries invite missions; hence,

some authors, following the example of the OCSE, have proposed commi

tting to invite missions as a requirement for participation in international

organisations (Muñoz-Pogossian and Veloso, 2015). While the existence of

a certifying agency does not eliminate the voluntary nature of the invitation

by countries, it can help to reassure those countries that have doubts about an

organisation’s professionalism or impartiality and thus favour its invitation.

Moreover, in the case of countries where the non-invitation of missions is

only for strategic reasons, certifying missions would take away arguments

when it comes to explaining and defending the non-invitation.

Observation missions have also been criticised for displacing electoral fraud

towards more complex crimes (Simpser, 2009; Simpser and Donno, 2012;

Daxecker, 2014). In this sense, it is not a logical solution to abolish electoral

observation to return to less costly or soft forms of electoral fraud. On the

contrary, electoral observation must be professionalised and strengthened to

control and deter increasingly complex crimes. This increasing complexity is

another reason to create a certication agency that could encourage organisa

tions to develop new strategies and methodologies to prevent electoral fraud.

Finally, the creation of a certication agency for observation missions can

have a very positive effect on reducing the limitations of IEO. However,

this institution may come with several limitations. Firstly, it can be argued

that providing explanations to accrediting members within each mission may

50 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

hinder the work of observers and, thus, their effectiveness. Furthermore, in

countries where the government controls the press, the effect of distingui

shing between proper missions and pseudo-missions may be diminished by

omitting this information from the public. However, the international and

donor effects could not be avoided. Finally, there may be a bias in the accre-

diting organisation that undermines the expected benets. Nevertheless, with

clear standards and the assumption of the role by a professional and reputable

organisation, this limitation could be controlled.

In summary, creating a prestigious, professional and impartial certifying

agency in charge of overseeing the application of existing election obser

vation standards would contribute substantially to overcoming the residual

limitations of election observation and alleviating those that have not yet

been resolved. Furthermore, despite the potential limitations of the proposed

policy, these are manageable and, in any case, do not outweigh the nume

rous anticipated benets. It is thus argued that incorporating the proposed

certication agency will help to better prevention of electoral fraud through

international observation missions.

Conclusions

This work has aimed to nd out how international election observation can

better prevent electoral fraud. The answer is the creation of an international

agency to certify the quality of electoral observation missions. In order to

propose such an agency, the preventive capacity of election observation mis

sions was rst analysed. From a theoretical perspective, adverse reports tri-

gger a series of national and international costs or punishments that prevent

electoral crimes. There is also empirical evidence that this mechanism works

in practice. However, more and better studies are needed to get a complete

picture of the functioning and capacity of the missions. In addition, the con-

text in which they take place affects their deterrent capacity.

Beyond the context, the deterrent capacity of observation missions is affec

ted by two types of limitations, some residual and others current. Although

desirable in some respects, the decentralisation of the observation system

leads to difculties in enforcing best practices. Currently, many countries

invite pseudo-observation missions to certify fraudulent elections and dilu-

te the control power of professional missions. As a result, pseudo-missions

have no incentive to apply many of the existing standards. Hence, residual

limitations can be resolved with a certifying agency; the lack of observers,

MATÍAS CARO 51

lack of training, lack of professionalism of observers, and short duration of

missions, among others, would be penalised in each report. There are also

limitations, such as the bias of the missions according to their donors, the

voluntary nature of the invitations, and the lack of certainty in punishments,

which the existence of a certication organisation could mitigate.

The proposal, in particular, implies the creation of an independent, tech

nically capable, impartial and reputable agency in charge of assessing the

quality of each election observation mission. This practice may incentivise

pseudo-missions to apply current best practices in pain of being classied as

awed or unprofessional missions. The rationale is that no government will

be interested in inviting missions whose favourable evaluations will be dis

missed or questioned. In addition, an international certication agency can

help control biases, false claims of neutrality and inter-organisational com

petition policies among professional missions. While it would not solve the

problem of the uncertainty of punishments, having an oversight body certif-

ying mission methodology would make it more difcult for the Great Powers

to ignore punishments based on their convenience. Finally, this certication

agency would respect the sovereignty of each country by not denying the

voluntary nature of inviting missions. However, it would contribute to con

dence in the independence and professionalism of the missions. This evalua-

tion can give condence to undecided countries and remove arguments for

those who decide strategically not to invite.

Leading authors in the eld have called for improving international elec

tion observation (Hyde, 2011a; Kelley, 2012). The proposal presented here is

an answer to one of the central problems of international observation: Who

watches the watchers? (Kelley, 2012). This reform would allow for progress

toward an orderly and more regulated international observation system wi-

thout the problems that centralisation or monopoly would bring. However,

this is not a proposal without limitations. First, it is based on the assumption

that observation missions effectively deter electoral fraud when the evidence

is incipient and more studies on the subject are needed. In this sense, the exis-

tence of a certication agency that analyses and collects information on mis-

sion performance could be helpful for the analysis of mission effectiveness

and best practices. Secondly, a detailed study of the problems associated with

this proposal and its design has not been presented, so future analyses on the

subject should investigate these limitations and design in greater depth.

The proposal of this paper is far from a denitive solution to electoral crimes

just because such solutions do not exist. Given the importance of what is

52 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 62 otoño 2024

at stake in each election, electoral fraud appears destined to persist. Never-

theless, It is possible to analyse and propose improvements to the current

control mechanisms. In particular, the proposed creation of an international

certication agency for IEO could, without signicant drawbacks, contribute

to preventing a wide range of international observation limitations.

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