Independencia de los bancos centrales: La "sabiduría convencional" a la luz de nuevos datos.

Autores/as

  • Ana Carolina Garriga Universidad Católica de Córdoba

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22529/sp.v0i40.1261

Palabras clave:

Independencia de bancos centrales – Política monetaria – Delegación – Bases de datos – Efectos de selección

Resumen

Este artículo utiliza la base de datos más exhaustiva sobre independenciade bancos centrales para ilustrar inconsistencias entre la sabiduría convencionaly la evidencia empírica en relación con estas institucionesmonetarias. Datos descriptivos muestran que la dinámica reformista delos bancos centrales no es un proceso exclusivo de la década de los noventay que, aunque la mayoría de las reformas incrementan la delegaciónde política monetaria a los bancos centrales, ha habido también importantesrevocaciones de la independencia de los bancos centrales.Asimismo, los países en vías de desarrollo en general y los regímenesautoritarios en particular, exhiben interesantes dinámicas en el diseñoinstitucional de sus bancos centrales. Estas dinámicas habían sido ignoradashasta el presente y abren nuevas vías de investigación para el futuro. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22529/sp.2016-2017.40.05

Descargas

Referencias

ACEMOGLU, D.; JOHNSON, S.; QUERUBIN, P. y ROBINSON, J. A.(2008). When Does Policy

Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence in NBER Working Paper nº

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

ALESINA, A.; MIRRLEES, J. y NEUMANN, M. J. M. (1989). Politics and Business Cycles in

Industrial Democracies. Economic Policy 4: 55-98.

ALESINA, A.; ROUBINI, N. y COHEN, G. D. (1997). Political Cycles and the Macro-economy: MIT press.

ALESINA, A., y SUMMERS, L. H. (1993). Central Bank Independence and Macro-economic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and

Banking 25: 151-63.

ALPANDA, S. y HONIG, A. (2009). The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 41: 1365-89.

BARRO, R. J. y GORDON, D. (1983). Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of

Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy 91: 101-21.

BEARCE, D. H. (2008). Not Complements, But Substitutes: Fixed Exchange Rate Commitments, Central Bank Independence, and External Currency Stability. International Studies Quarterly 52: 807-24.

BENDOR, J.; GLAZER, A. y HAMMOND, T. H. (2001). Theories of Delegation. Annual Review of Political Science 4: 235-69.

BERNHARD, W. (1998). A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence. American Political Science Review 92: 311-27.

BERNHARD, W. y LEBLANG, D. (2002). Political Parties and Monetary Commitments.

International Organization 56: 803-30.

BLINDER, A. S. (1998). Central Banking in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press.

BODEA, C. (2010). Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions. International Organization 64:

-42.

BODEA, C.; GARRIGA, A. C. y HIGASHIJIMA, M. (2016). Monetary Constraints, Spending, and the Autocratic Survival in Dominant Party Regimes. Paper presented at

the 2016 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.

BODEA, C. y HICKS, R. (2015a). International Finance and Central Bank Independence:

Institutional Diffusion and the Flow and Cost of Capital. Journal of Politics 77:

-84.

. (2015b). Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions. International Organization 69: 35-61.

BODEA, C. y MASAAKI, H. (2015). Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can

the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?. British Journal of Political Science

FirstView: 1-24.

BOYLAN, D. M. (1998). Preemptive Strike: Central Bank Reform in Chiles Transition

from Authoritarian Rule. Comparative Politics 30: 443-62.

BROZ, J. L. (2002). Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. International Organization 56: 861-87.

CARSTENS, A. y JÁCOME, L. I. (2005). La Reforma de los Bancos Centrales Latinoamericanos: Avances y desafíos. El Trimestre Económico 72: 683-732.

CÉSPEDES, L. F. y VALDÉS P., R. (2006). Autonomía de Bancos Centrales: La Experiencia Chilena. Economía Chilena 9: 25-45.

CLARK, W. R. y AREL-BUNDOCK, V. (2013). Independent but Not Indifferent: Partisan

Bias in Monetary Policy at the Fed. Economics & Politics 25: 1-26.

CLARK, W. R.; GOLDER, S. N. y POAST, P. (2013). Monetary Institutions and the Political Survival of Democratic Leaders. International Studies Quarterly 57: 556-67.

CROWE, C. y MEADE, E. E. (2007). The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around

the World. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 69-90.

CUKIERMAN, A. (1992). Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence: Theory

and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

. (2008). Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions -

Past, Present and Future. European Journal of Political Economy 24: 722-36.

CUKIERMAN, A.; MILLER, G. P. y NEYAPTI, B. (2002). Central Bank Reform, Liberalization, and Inflation in Transition Economies. An International Perspective. Journal

of Monetary Economics 49: 237-64.

CUKIERMAN, A.; WEBB, S. B. y NEYAPTI, B. (1992). Measuring the Independence of

Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcome. The World Bank Economic Review 6: 353-98.

DE JONG, E. (2002). Why are Price Stability and Statutory Independence of Central

Banks Negatively Correlated? The Role of Culture. European Journal of Political

Economy 18: 675-94.

DEBELLE, G. y STANLEY, F. (1995). How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? in

Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers, ed. Jeffrey C.

Fuhrer, Conference Series Nº 38. Boston, MA: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

-221.

EIJFFINGER, S. C. W. y DE HAAN, J. (1996). The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence. Paper presented at the Princeton Special Papers in International Economics, Nº 19, Princeton, NJ.

EPSTEIN, G. 2009. Post-war Experiences with Developmental Central Banks: The Good,

the Bad and the Hopeful. New York, NY: United Nations, http://unctad.org/en/

Docs/gdsmdpg2420091_en.pdf.

FERNÁNDEZ-ALBERTOS, J. (2015). The Politics of Central Bank Independence. Annual

Review of Political Science 18: 217-37.

FRANZESE, R. J. (1999). Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive

Governments, and Inflation. American Journal of Political Science 43: 681-706.

GALBRAITH, J. K. (1998 [1958]) The Affluent Society. Houghton Mifflin.

GARRIGA, A. C. (2016a). Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set.

International Interactions 42: 849-68.

. (2016b). Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set. Harvard

Dataverse.

GRILLI, V.; MASCIANDARO, D. y Tabellini, G. (1991). Political and Monetary Institutions

and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries. Economic Policy: 341-92.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1999). Code of Good Practices on Transparency in

Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of Principles. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

JENSEN, H. (1997). Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation. The American Economic Review 87: 911-20.

JOHNSON, J. (2006). Two-Track Diffusion and Central Bank Embeddedness: The Politics

of Euro Adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Review of International Political Economy 13: 361-86.

KEEFER, P. y STASAVAGE, D. (2002). Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the

Credibility of Monetary Commitments. International Organization 56: 751-74.

. (2003). The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence,

and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. The American Political Science Review 97:

-23.

KLOMP, J. y DE HAAN, J. (2010). Inflation and Central Bank Independence: A Meta Regression Analysis. Journal of Economic Surveys 24: 593-621.

KYDLAND, F. E. y PRESCOTT, E. C. (1977). Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency for Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85: 473-91.

LOHMANN, S. (1998). Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy. World Politics 50: 401-46.

MARSHALL, M. G. y Jaggers, K. Polity IV Dataset. Center for International Deve-lopment and Conflict Management. University of Maryland.

MAXFIELD, S. (1997). Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of

Central Banking in Developing Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press.

MESEGUER, C. (2005). Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New

Order. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598:

-82.

NEYAPTI, B. y DINÇER, N. (2008). What Determines the Legal Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision?. Contemporary Economic Policy 26: 607-22.

PASTOR, M. y WISE, C. (1997). State Policy, Distribution and Neoliberal Reform in

Mexico. Journal of Latin American Studies 29: 419-56.

POLILLO, S. y GUILLÉN, M. F. (2005). Globalization Pressures and the State: The Global Spread of Central Bank Independence. American Journal of Sociology 110:

-802.

REENOCK, C.; STATON, J. K. y RADEAN, M. (2013). Legal Institutions and Democratic

Survival. The Journal of Politics 75: 491-505.

RODRIK, D. (1991). Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in Developing Coun-

tries. Journal of Development Economics 36: 229-42.

ROGOFF, K. S. (1985). The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100: 1169-89.

ROSAS, G. (2006). Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises. American Journal of Political Science 50: 175-91.

VAN WIJNBERGEN, S. (1985). Trade Reform, Aggregate Investment and Capital Flight.

Economics Letters 19: 369-72.

WORLD BANK (1992). How the Independence of Central Banks Affects Policy Outcomes. In World Bank Policy Research Bulletin. Vol. 3. Washington, DC:

World Bank.

Publicado

2017-08-11

Número

Sección

Artículos

Cómo citar

Independencia de los bancos centrales: La "sabiduría convencional" a la luz de nuevos datos. (2017). Studia Politicæ, 40, 103-128. https://doi.org/10.22529/sp.v0i40.1261

Artículos similares

1-10 de 348

También puede Iniciar una búsqueda de similitud avanzada para este artículo.

Artículos más leídos del mismo autor/a