Las elecciones que hacen los gobernadores: los roles de los "cheecks and balances" y la comptencia política.
Resumen
Los Estados usualmente difieren de manera importante en cuanto a la provisión de bienes públicos y corrupción. ¿Por qué algunos gobiernos estatales son capaces de proveer adecuados servicios de salud y educación pero otros tienden a especializarse en la provisión de bienes privados como empleo público y transferencias clientelares? ¿Por qué algunos Estados son más capaces de promover desarrollo económico mientras que otros permiten un estancamiento? ¿Por qué la corrupción es más prevalente en algunos Estados que en otros? Explorando la idea de que las instituciones políticas son determinantes importantes de las políticas implementadas por los Estados, proponemos un modelo para estudiar el proceso de toma de decisiones y después testeamos sus implicancias en datos de unidades estatales brasileras para el periodo que va desde 1999 hasta 2006. El interés de estos tests empíricos es estudiar el impacto de la competencia política y los checks and balances en las características de las políticas de los Estados. La competencia política y los checks and balances tienen efectos importantes en las elecciones hechas por los gobernadores y otros actores políticos al determinar cuánto tiempo esperan estar en el poder, lo que pueden hacer cuando están en el poder y a qué costos. Desarrollamos un índice de checks and balances para los Estados brasileros y testeamos la interacción de los checks and balances con la competencia política. Encontramos que el impacto de la competencia política varía con el grado de checks and balances.Descargas
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