Hans Joas

STUDIA POLITICÆ Número 65 otoño 2025 pág. 210–218

Recibido: 06/07/2025 | Aceptado: 06/07/2025

Publicada por la Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales

de la Universidad Católica de Córdoba, Córdoba, República Argentina.

t is always an honor for an author when colleagues make his or her wri-

tings the subject of thorough reading and detailed written discussion. In

this respect, I am very pleased with each of the volumes and journal issues

that have been dedicated to my work in various languages in recent years.

Now, for the rst time, this is happening in the Spanish-speaking world. I

would therefore like to thank all the contributors and editors, especially the

initiators Diego Fonti and Claudio Viale.

The publication of this issue is certainly also due to the fact that a whole

series of my books are now translated into Spanish. There are still gaps; in

particular, there is no edition of my book The Genesis of Values, which re

presents the decisive link between my work on a pragmatist social theory and

that on a historical sociology of religion and morality

On the other hand, for example in the review by Martina Torres Criscuolo

within this issue, I am quite rightly accused of insufcient consideration of

Latin American thinkers. It is true that I have only briey commented on

Catholic liberation theology - albeit my fundamental sympathy with it, an

unforgettable personal encounter with Enrique Dussel in Mexico in 2001 and

the supervision of a doctoral thesis at the University of Chicago, which led to

Hans Joas, Die Entstehung der Werte, Frankfurt/M. 1997. This book has been translated

into English, French, Italian, Polish and Russian. For a long time a Chilean publishing

house planned a Spanish translation, but nally it did not come about.

http://dx.doi.org/10.22529/sp.2025.65.11

HANS JOAS 211

one of the best books on the subject and the appointment of the author to the

Chair of Catholic Studies at Harvard University

. In any case, my latest book

contains an extensive chapter on the beginning of Spanish colonial history,

the work of the Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas, the Jesuits in Paraguay

and Bishop Vasco de Quiroga in Mexico.

But I certainly still have a lot to

learn here in order to be able to hold my own in dialog with Latin American

intellectuals.

I would like to begin my response to the contributions in this issue with those

that encompass the broadest scope and by which I feel particularly well un

derstood. This applies rst of all to the philosopher Jesús Conill, who teaches

in Spain and who, more than most, recognizes the close connection that exists

between my theory of action, the theory of the emergence of values, histo-

rical sociology and the methodological proposal of an “afrmative genealo-

gy”. He recognizes that for decades I have tried to counter the overwhelming

inuence of Max Weber’s theory of action and concept of rationalization and

its transformation by Jürgen Habermas in the form of a theory of communi-

cative action and communicative rationalization with an alternative that does

better justice to the problems of the history of religion, but also to those of a

history of secular ideals. What I nd particularly instructive about his con-

tribution is that it contains specic references to Spanish-speaking thinkers

- such as Xavier Zubiri - whom I do not know and from whom, as well as

from Jesús Conill himself, I hope to learn in the future. Compared to this

pleasing agreement, the small indications of possible differences between us

recede completely. The critical objection to my expression “non-rational for-

ms of human communication” must be countered by the fact that, following

Talcott Parsons, I make a conceptual distinction between “non-rational” and

“irrational”, i.e. the non-rational should by no means be classied as inferior

to the rational. This does not mean, for example, that poetic expression is

based on an opposition to all rationality, but only that we do not do it justice

if we apply the standard of discursive, argumentative rationality to it. There

is a fundamental similarity in thinking here, which is perhaps even greater

than Jesús Conill assumes. The remarks at the end of the essay are too brief

for me to fully grasp them. Conill relies more on Nietzsche, I rely more on

Troeltsch. I have dealt with the more precise difference between the two and

Raúl E. Zegarra, A Revolutionary Faith. Liberation Theology Between Public Religion

and Public Reason, Stanford 2023.

Hans Joas, Universalismus. Weltherrschaft und Menschheitsethos, Berlin 2025, p. 425-

489

212 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 65 otoño 2025

Troeltsch’s criticism of Nietzsche in my latest book.

It would be interesting

to pursue the question of whether there is a real or only apparent difference

between Conill and myself.

I also feel very well understood in the two important contributions by the

Swedish social scientist Björn Wittrock, which have already been published

in German but are now appearing here in their original English version. Sin

ce the author himself does not come from the Spanish-speaking world, he

admittedly does not fall within the scope of my improved engagement with

Spanish or Latin American thinkers. I would like to emphasize at this point

that I have been associated with him as a colleague and friend for decades and

owe him much institutional support and intellectual stimulation. Wittrock is

one of the most important contributors to the international discourse on the

so-called Axial Age. He has worked as closely with the Israeli sociologist Sh-

muel Eisenstadt as I have with the American sociologist Robert Bellah.

Both

of his contributions here sketch a convincing picture of the development of

modern social theory; I have no objection to this. As I have already explained

elsewhere, I hesitate to follow Wittrock in his assessment that the intellectual

projects of Weber and Troeltsch were compatible or even complementary.

I myself have come to the conclusion that Troeltsch pursued the project of a

genealogy of moral universalism, albeit limited to Christianity and Stoa, and

Weber that of an explanation of the emergence of the modern capitalist spirit

or a genealogy of “occidental rationalism”, which drove him to pioneering

achievements in comparison with India, China and the Islamic world. My

ambition is to pursue the genealogy of moral universalism comparatively in

the same way that Weber did with his other question. I cannot go deeper here

explaining how these different projects relate to each, but the difference must

be clearly stated.

I can also recognize myself in considerable parts of Alejandro Pelni’s arti

cle “Hans Joas as a Global Thinker”, although not in all of them. The (iro-

Ibid., p. 39-70. I have presented my book mirroring Nietzsche`s, as a way „from the gene-

alogy of morals to the genealogy of moral universalism“.

Cf. Johann P. Arnason, S.N. Eisenstadt, Björn Wittrock (Ed.), Axial Civilizations and

World History, Leiden (NL)/Boston 2005; Robert N. Bellah, Hans Joas (Ed.), The Axial

Age and Its Consequences, Cambridge 2012.

Hans Joas, “Kritik der „Entzauberung“ und Theorie der Sakralisierung: Voraussetzungen

und Konsequenzen”, in: Magnus Schlette et al. (Ed.), Idealbildung, Sakralisierung, Reli-

gion. Beiträge zu Hans Joas‘ „Die Macht des Heiligen“, Frankfurt/M. 2022, p. 493-514,

here p. 497.

HANS JOAS 213

nic?) characterization of my intellectual path, which - according to Pelni

- “begins in Erfurt, continues in Chicago and, one might say, culminates in

the Vatican” strikes me as completely fantastic. To avoid giving readers the

wrong impression, I would like to emphasize that my path did not begin in

Erfurt, where I only became active at the age of 50; that I was already in

Chicago as a doctoral student in 1975/76, was a visiting professor for the

rst time in 1985 and have been teaching there for decades since 2000;

and that there can certainly be no question of a culmination in the Vatican,

especially since the decisive position there was only recently lled... In this

characterization, the Bavarian Catholicism that shaped me and the intellec-

tual and political milieu of Berlin, where I spent and spend most of my life,

are not mentioned at all.

Unfortunately, decisive aspects of my involvement with “global” issues are

also overlooked.

There is no consideration of my books on war, although one

of them has already been translated into Spanish, neither of other mentions

in my writings that have to do with the global history of moral universalism.

I nd that unfair. I must also raise an objection to the interpretation of my

views on the relationship between individual and collective forms of expe-

riencing self-transcendence. I am a staunch opponent of attempts to ascribe

one or the other to individual religions, denominations, cultures or regions

of the world - as if Protestants were exclusively individualists and Catholics

collectivists, as if Europeans were only one thing and Asians only another, as

if modern people were only one thing and pre-modern people only another.

It is difcult for me to recognize my own views especially on the last pages

of the essay

With these critical remarks on a nonetheless interesting contribution, I come

to Marcos Breuer’s essay “Hans Joas’ Theory of Religion and the Founda

tions of the Modern State”. In several respects, this author attributes to me

views that are the exact opposite of what I advocate. This is not a matter

of nuance, but of complete misunderstanding. Perhaps it is best if, quite

independently of this text, I formulate some of the main propositions of

my theory of religion with outmost clarity. Firstly, although I am a critic

of the so-called theory of secularization, I am by no means a proponent of

Hans Joas, War and Modernity: Studies in the History of Vilolence in the 20th Century; Hans

Joas, Wolfgang Knöbl, Kriegsverdrängung. Ein Problem in der Geschichte der Sozialtheo-

rie, Frankfurt/M. 2008 (there is a translation of this book into Chinese, and one into English

with the title War in Social Thought; nally: Hans Joas, Friedensprojekt Europa? München

2020.

214 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 65 otoño 2025

the thesis that there is no weakening of religion anywhere. As a resident

of one of the most secular cities in the world (Berlin), I would have to be

struck with blindness if I denied the phenomena of secularization in this

way. The criticism of secularization theory concerns the criticism of the

thesis that phenomena of secularization can be explained by processes of

modernization. This is why I have tried to develop an alternative explana-

tion in many of my works, for example in the volume Faith as an Option,

which I call a political sociology of religion.

Secondly, I expressly do not

advocate the thesis that it is attributed here to me, namely that there is no

human being without religion and that religiosity is a universal anthropolo-

gical fact. What I am arguing is that experiences of self-transcendence and

dynamics of ideal formation are universal in an anthropological sense - but

their religious articulation and interpretation are not. Thirdly, I do not argue

that experiences of self-transcendence are experiences of the sacred, but

rather that the sacred emerges from these experiences - the experiences are

thus constitutive and not derivative. Fourthly, I do not claim that modern

societies can only secure their cohesion through a religion in common; what

I do claim is that they cannot be conict-free and stable without a basic

consensus on fundamental issues.

Perhaps these attempts at clarication will sufce as rebuttals; it should only

be added that the reference to other authors who have also criticized the cen

tral elements of my theory, without even having properly scrutinized them,

does not increase its cogency.

In the next step, I would like to turn to the two contributions that are dedi-

cated to my connection to American pragmatism. More than a decade ago,

the philosopher María Cristina Di Gregori, who has unfortunately recently

passed away, presented a clear and insightful account of my theory of the

creativity of human action. It is not outdated in most respects. It just seems

to me that it exaggerates the importance of John Dewey in my work, because

it completely ignores my early and ongoing engagement with George Her-

bert Mead. The remark she mentions from the American philosopher Vincent

Hans Joas, Faith as an Option, Stanford 2014.

Regarding the accusation that I have not sufciently dealt with the explanatory potential

of contractualism, I would like to point out that the critique of neo-literalism and a primar-

ily normative alternative to it plays a central role in my work, although not in the eld of

political theory, but in that of social theory. Cf. Hans Joas, Wolfgang Knöbl, Social Theory.

Twenty Introductory Lectures, Cambridge 2009, p. 20-42, 94-122.

HANS JOAS 215

Colapietro from 2009 about the lack of reception of my theory among philo-

sophers also seems to me no longer accurate.10 In Germany, for example, I

am in the fortunate position of being able to refer to the writings of Matthias

Jung, who has related my theory of action in a highly original way to more

recent developments in the philosophy of mind and language.11 Because I

mainly referred to Dewey’s theory of aesthetic experience in my book on

creativity, she fears one-sidedness on my part. In other works, I have mainly

dealt with Dewey’s theory of religion. Di Gregori’s central critical point,

however, is a different one. She accuses me of insufcient consideration of

Dewey’s later work, in particular the book “Knowing and the Known”, pu-

blished with Arthur F. Bentley in 1949. I have to accept this accusation in the

literal sense. However, it has not yet become entirely clear to me whether

Dewey really developed his philosophy in this work beyond terminological

changes (“transaction”) in a way that is consequential for my own project.

The essay does not really specify this possibility, but it leaves me with an

important reminder.

Germán Arroyo also deals specically with my connection to John Dewey

and generally rejects my criticism of him. He does so by means of a compari

son with the much less critical connection to Dewey in the thinking of the cri-

tical theorist Axel Honneth. I leave the assessment of the section on Honneth

to him. Overall, Arroyo comes to the conclusion that Honneth remains closer

to Dewey than I do and that both Hegelianisms differ positively from my

critical assessment of Hegel. I have two problems with the result of Arroyo’s

considerations. One of them lays where the assessment on the correctness of

an interpretation is not sufciently separated from the approval of the inter-

preted thinker. My clear criticism of Dewey’s “sacralization of democracy”

in his book A Common Faith is not rejected by Arroyo as a misunderstan-

ding, i.e. as a false interpretation. Rather, he rejects its content because, like

Honneth, he himself is closer to this Deweyan idea than I am. But this is

actually clear from the outset and does not require any complicated expla-

Since she leans strongly on Richard Bernstein´s book of 2010 The Pragmatic Turn, I

allow myself to add that I greatly appreciate his praise of my understanding of pragmatism

(p. 24), but of course I also regret that the last of my books that he mentions, precisely the

book on the Creativity of Action, was published in the German original version in 1992, and

thus he left out of his consideration all the following decades.

Matthias Jung, Der bewusste Ausdruck. Anthropologie der Artikulation, Berlin 2009, i.e.

p. 222-259 and p. 351-356

216 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 65 otoño 2025

nation. As for the question of whether Dewey remained a lifelong Hegelian

or, as a thinker of historical contingency, increasingly detached himself from

all teleological philosophy of history - as I maintain - it seems crucial to

me that we assign Dewey’s statements to the exact phase in his intellectual

development from which the statement originates. It is probably undisputed

that Dewey’s intensive reception of Darwin already distanced his historical

thinking from Hegel in essential respects. This becomes even more apparent

when, in coming to terms with the First World War, he speaks of it as an

opportunity to leave the “fool’s paradise” of an evolutionist and teleological

belief in progress. In 1916, he wrote “We confused rapidity of change with

advance, and we took certain gains in our own comfort and ease as signs that

cosmic forces were working inevitably to improve the whole state of human

affairs.”

The question of how far this revision went, whether progress only

became more contingent for Dewey, but whether he ultimately did not doubt

it, does not need to be discussed here. However, there seems to me to be no

doubt that Dewey’s classication as a contingency-oriented historical thinker

in my book Under the Spell of Freedom is justied.

Of course, it is a different question whether we agree with Dewey’s view that

belief in democracy as an ideal can itself develop sufcient binding forces for

a liberal democracy to protect it from instability and collapse. I have rejected

this belief. I am not, as Breuer and perhaps Arroyo have accused me of doing,

attributing an indispensable role for democracies to Christianity or religion.

I am simply saying that there must be value traditions that go beyond belief

in democracy itself, such as belief in the sacredness of the person, which can

also be founded in intense experiences of the violation of this sacredness,

the degradation of the human being. “Never again war, never again fascism,

never again Holocaust” - such slogans do not express a religion, but neither

do they only express a belief in democracy. I am almost surprised that my

objection to Dewey is controversial here, because this aspect of his theory

of religion, if it is understood in this way, has hardly any supporters today. I

say this not as an opponent of Dewey’s belief in democracy, but as a critic of

his simplistic notion of the cultural cohesive forces that democracy requires.

Perhaps not having recognized this connection is, for me, the second difcul

ty with Arroyo’s text. Nor should it be overlooked that my criticism of this

aspect does not mean that I have dismissed Dewey’s contribution to religious

theory out of hand. The opposite is true, as will be clear to anyone who takes

John Dewey, Progress, in: International Journal of Ethics 26 (1916), S. 311-322, here p.

312f.

HANS JOAS 217

note of my Dewey chapter in The Genesis of Values and its function in the

argument of that book.

Enrique Muñoz Pérez deals knowledgeably not with my assessment of

Dewey, but with that of Max Scheler. Unfortunately, he limits himself to the

philosophy of religion and leaves aside Scheler’s ethics, his “material ethics

of values”, and my interpretation of it.

Instead, he offers an informative

account of the differences between Husserl and Scheler in the understanding

of “evidence”. However, another point seems decisive to me. The author

defends “personalistic monotheism” and sees Scheler’s strength and origi-

nality precisely in having defended it in the same way. Now, this certainly

corresponds to my own (Christian) religious convictions. However, I diffe-

rentiate between these and the tasks of a comprehensive theory of religion.

In this, it seems more plausible to me to claim anthropological universality

and “evidence” for the experience of self-transcendence and the constitution

of sacrality in these experiences than for the idea of a single personal God.

If this is true, however, then additional steps are necessary in order to show

how concepts of holiness become images of God and even of one God. Wi-

thout these additional steps, a phenomenological conception of God such as

Scheler’s seems to me incomplete and unconvincing.

I have already referred to the short contribution by Martina Torres Criscuolo

in the introduction, because in the rst of three desiderata she called for my

inclusion of Latin American thinkers to a greater extent and I agree with this

demand. However, she has two further suggestions for me. One is aimed at

a more detailed discussion of Nietzsche than the short concluding section of

my Spell of Freedom offers. On this point, too, I would like to point out that

my Genesis of Values begins with just such a discussion, because I ascribe

to Nietzsche a pioneering role in questions of the origin of values and at

the same time nd his comments on Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism

On the latest creative confrontations with Dewey´s theory of religion: Randall E. Auxier,

John R. Shook, Idealism and Religion in Dewey’s Philosophy, in: Steven Fesmire (Ed.),

The Oxford Handbook of Dewey, New York 2019, p. 651-673; Annette Pitschmann, Re-

ligiosität als Qualität des Säkularen. Die Religionstheorie John Deweys, Tübingen 2017,

summarized in Annette Pitschmann, Religion als Sinn für das Mögliche, in: Thomas M.

Schmidt, Annette Pitschmann (Ed.), Religion und Säkularisierung. Ein interdisziplinäres

Handbuch, Stuttgart 2014, p. 99-114

Hans Joas, Die Entstehung der Werte, p. 133-161. Also Olivier Agard, Hans Joas, lecteur

de Scheler, in: Alexandre Escudier (dir.), Hans Joas et la question des valeurs, Raison pu-

blique 27,

2024, p. 29-36

218 STUDIA POLITICÆ Nº 65 otoño 2025

completely untenable. In this I am in good company with Max Weber, Ernst

Troeltsch, Max Scheler and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

The last suggestion is that I should have presented my theory of religion

more systematically than I did in the portraits that make up a large part of my

Spell of Freedom book. This suggestion gives me the opportunity to point out

two things. Firstly, Under the Spell of Freedom should be seen as the second

volume of a trilogy that began with The Power of the Sacred and was con

cluded with the present global history of moral universalism. In the trilogy,

I was concerned in volume 1 with Max Weber’s rejection and in volume 2

with Hegel’s, and thus, taken together, with the two most inuential narrati-

ves on the historical relationship between religion and political power. This

should provide the premises for my own alternative account of this history as

an afrmative genealogy of moral universalism. The systematic presentation

of my theory of religion and ideal formation will follow in the future and in

other ways, if it is granted to me to do so.